This paper contests the results of Cohen and Wang (JFE 2013, CW) that staggered board (SB) lowers firm value, based on the stock price reaction to two Delaware court rulings in the case of Airgas (2010). The first ruling weakened SB's potency and the second restored it. Contrary to CW's findings of a significant negative effect of SB on the value of affected firms, we find no such affect which is statistically significant for both their sample and for a different sample.
Introduction
In companies with staggered (or classified) boards of directors, the board is divided into (usually three) classes and shareholders can elect only one class in each annual election. This is considered a powerful anti-takeover defense because it prolongs the process of gaining a majority control of the board and makes the process more costly to hostile acquirers. In particular, the common defensive measure called shareholder rights plan ("poison pill") can be removed by gaining control of the board, but is made more difficult in a firm with staggered board (henceforth SB). Studies show a negative relation between staggered board and firm value, 1 implying that SB is harmful to shareholders. However, Cohen and Wang (2013, p. 627) point out that this relation "might not imply causation but could reflect the greater propensity of low-value firms to maintain such provisions." Cohen and Wang (2013, henceforth CW) resolve this problem of identifying causality by studying the value effect of a natural experiment involving SB: two Delaware court rulings in 2010 in the case of Airgas. The first ruling weakened the potency of SB and the second restored its potency. Testing the stock price reaction of Delaware firms that were potentially affected by the rulings, CW find that the sum of the price impact of the first ruling that weakened SB and the negatively-signed price impact of the second ruling that strengthened SB is positive and significant for affected firms compared to that of control firms that were not affected by the rulings. The authors conclude that their evidence support the view that SB harms firm value.
We challenge the CW's conclusion, presenting results that are inconsistent with theirs.
(1) Using CW's sample and test method (as well as other common methods), the two Delaware court rulings have insignificant effect on stock prices of firms that could be affected by these rulings. Thus, there is no evidence that SB is value decreasing.
(2) Using a different sample of Delaware firms, we again find an insignificant effect of the two Delaware court rulings on stock prices.
(3) We test the effect of de-staggering of the board of directors -which makes the entire board elected every year -on firm's return on assets (ROA). We find no significant evidence that de-staggering improves firm performance. This is notable because de-staggering is voluntary (or done under stockholders' pressure) and thus intended to be beneficial.
Thus, there is no evidence that SB is value decreasing. This conclusion is consistent with recent evidence by Larcker, Ormazabal and Taylor (2011) that find that legislative proposals that may restrict board structure and possibly weaken the SB provision are not value enhancing. And, Cremers and Ferrell (2014) and Cremers, Sepe and Litov (2014) show evidence that SB is value increasing: SB adoption increase firm value. 2 Another explanation for the insignificant effect of the court rulings is that the tests have low power because of small sample size. It can also be that the Airgas rulings are inappropriate to provide information on the value effect of SB.
Below, we brief discuss the Delaware court rulings in the 2010 Airgas case (Section 1) and then we present empirical evidence on the value effects of these rulings. Section 2 discusses the samples and test methodology and presents results for CW's sample and for our sample of Delaware firms. In Section 3 we analyze the effect of de-staggering on firms' return on assets (ROA). We review the views on the value effect of SB in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
Institutional background of the Airgas case
In February 2010, Air Products launched a public tender offer to acquire Airgas. Airgas was protected by a poison pill and its board was staggered. Airgas rejected the offer claiming that it undervalued the company. (The offer was eventually raised to $5.5 billion,) Air Products then sought to win control of the board in order to rescind the pill. At Airgas's annual meeting 
Testing the effects of the Airgas court rulings on stock prices
CW propose to use the two 2010 Delaware court rulings on Airgas as a natural experiment to assess the causal effect of SB on firm value. The rulings are (1) exogenous events and thus their effect on stock prices is not marred by endogeneity, and (2) they provide contrasting effects of the potency of SB within a short period of time. CW study the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around each court ruling using a sample of Delaware-incorporated firms divided into "treated" firms that could be affected by the ruling and "control" (unaffected) firms.
CW use the CAR on October 11 and 12 for the first ruling that was made on October 8 after the market close, and use the CAR on November 23 and 24 for the November 23 rd ruling that was announced during the trading day.
Data samples
We use two samples. The first is that of CW, kindly provided by Alma Cohen (henceforth, "CW sample"). It consists of Delaware-incorporated firms with SB excluding real estate investment trusts (REITs), firms with dual ownership and firms with over 50% insider equity ownership. "Treated" and "control" firms are, respectively, firms whose annual shareholder meeting is between September and December and between January and March.
Treated firms could be affected because a potential raider could replace a third of the board in a September-December meeting and then accelerate the following meeting to be early in the following year, thus concluding the takeover within a few months. 
Hypotheses and test methodology
CW's hypothesize that "the value of the affected companies was increased by the initial ruling weakening the antitakeover force of staggered boards and was decreased by the ruling's subsequent reversal" (p. 628). This is the alternative hypothesis, H1, to the null hypothesis H0 of no effect of these rulings on affected companies' values.
We denote the dates following the first and second court rulings, October 11-12 and November 23-24, by DAY1 and DAY2, respectively, and denote the stocks' two-day cumulative abnormal return on these two periods by CAR1 and CAR2, respectively. CW multiply CAR2 by -1 because the effect of the second ruling contrasted the effect of the first one. CW's test regresses the firms' CAR1 and -CAR2 on a dummy variable Treated that equals 1 for treated firms (that could be affected by the rulings), and Treated = 0 for the control firms. The coefficient of Treated, which we denote by dCAR measures the difference between treated and control firms of CAR1-CAR2. The null hypothesis is dCAR = 0. If dCAR > 0, SB is value decreasing: the weakening of SB raised CAR1 and its restoration lowered CAR2, raising -CAR2.
We use CW sample and their event-study methodology ("Method 1"), and add two tests by conventional methods of calculating CAR. All tests produce similar results.
4 Details of the excluded firms: Diamond Management (DTPI) was acquired by PriceWaterHouseCoopers on November 2, 2010; ArcSight (ARST) was acquired by Hewlett-Packard on October 22, 2010. For these firms, the price at the first event were reflecting the outstanding acquisition offer. For Image Entertainment (DISK), ORE Pharmaceuticals (ORXE) and Altigen Communications (ATGN), the last valid observations in CRSP were February 2, 2010 , March 24, 2010 and March 15, 2010 respectively, i.e., before the first ruling.
Method 1:
This replicated CW's methodology. In the first step, the β coefficients of each stock j are estimated by the following regression model, using daily returns over 120 trading days ending on September 30, 2010:
MktRf, SMB, HML and UMD are the return benchmark factors due to Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) . 6 The second step is a cross-firm regression
AnnRetj,t is the announcement return for stock j on day t estimated over four days, two in DAY1
and two in DAY2, and the β coefficients are those obtained from the first step. The abnormal returns are the residuals δj,t. Then, a stock's CAR1j and CAR2j are, respectively, the sum of the two residuals for the two event days of DAY1 and DAY2.
Method 2:
In this commonly-used event-study methodology, the abnormal return for stock j on day t is the difference between the stock return for that day and the predicted return, calculated as the sum of the products of the estimated βs (from (1)) by the respective factors' return for that day and the intercept. These daily abnormal returns are then aggregated into CAR1j and CAR2j.
Method 3: Portfolio abnormal returns. This method accommodates possible cross-stocks return correlations on any day, given that the event is on the same day for all stocks. We construct two portfolios of treated and control stocks and calculate the average daily return across stocks in each portfolio. TMC is the Treated-Minus-Control portfolio return. We then regress TMC on the MktRf, SMB, HML and UMD are, respectively, the excess return on the market portfolio over the risk-free rate, the return on small-minus-large firms, the return on high-minus-low book-to-market ratio firms, and the return on winner minus loser stocks. Data are obtained from Ken French's data library. These factors undergo revisions over time, so there may be small differences between studies that calculate CAR using the factors at different times. But the differences are very small. of DAY2, respectively. The negative sign for the November event days follows CW's methodology. (These dummy variables equal zero in all other days.) The coefficient of DUM1-2 estimates dCAR, the differential CAR between the treated and control sample for the two event dates together. The data period is April 1-December 31, 2010 (191 days) which straddle the time of the court rulings.
Test results using CW sample
INSERT Airgas's stock, included in CW's, was naturally affected by the rulings which directly affected the likelihood of being immediately acquired for a high premium. It had CAR1 = 2.82% and CAR2 = -6.01%, thus CAR1-CAR2 = 8.83% (using Method 2). Excluding Airgas, the coefficient of Treated falls to 0.266, less than a third of CW's estimate, with t = 0.59 (p = 0.56) with industry fixed effects. This is quite insignificant, both statistically and economically.
There is a problem in CW's use of six-digit GICS codes for industry fixed effects since in 11 cases there is only one firm per GICS code. When estimating CW's model under Method 1 using four-digit GICS codes (and excluding Airgas), the coefficient of Treated is 0.0290 with t = 0.073. That is, the effect of the Delaware court rulings was practically zero.
Given that the second court ruling reversed the first one, these rulings should affect stock returns in opposite directions and there should be negative correlation between CAR1 and CAR2. Regressing CAR2 on CAR1 from Method 1 we obtain that the slope coefficient is -0.146 with t = 0.66, insignificant (we use robust standard errors to calculate the t-values). The coefficient is similar using Method 2.
Using Method 3, we again obtain an insignificant value effect. The coefficient of DUM1-2 (the total CAR of the two rulings) is 0.360 with t = 0.35. It drops to 0.240 (t = 0.23) when Airgas is excluded.
In summary, there is no evidence that SB hurts firm value. The estimated effect of the rulings that affected the potency of SB is insignificant both economically and statistically.
Tests using an alternative sample
We present results using a sample obtained from the ISS database that covers the S&P 1500 firms. This database, used by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen and Farrell (2009) to study the effects of antitakeover measures on firm value, is more accessible to researchers than FactSet's database employed by CW. We use only Delaware-incorporated firms and conduct the analysis for the three samples below. (Airgas in not included.) Following CW, we also exclude real estate investment trusts (REITs) and firms with dual ownership. research" (our highlighting). These views suggest that firms with SB may be potentially affected by the court rulings, hence we treat them as "treated" while "control" firms are those with no SB. S1 includes 776 Delaware firms divided into 397 treated and 379 control firms. This sample includes very large firms such as Walmart with market capitalization of $203.6 billion (on Jan 31, 2010) which are less likely to become takeover targets. 8 We thus construct a subsample of smaller firms, S1.s which excludes the largest 5% of firms. S1.s includes 738 firms, the largest having market capitalization of $30.98 billion and the smallest $0.07 billion, divided into 391
with SB and 347 with no SB.
S2: Following CW, "treated" and "control" firms are firms with SB whose annual meeting is between September-December and between January-March, respectively. S2 contains 74 firms of which 32 are "treated" and 42 are "control" firms. The market capitalization of the largest firm in this sample is $41.4 billion. S2.s, the subsample which excludes the largest 5% of firms, includes 71 firms with maximum size of $16.1 billion and minimum size of $0.14 billion, of which 31 and 40 are "treated" and "control" firms, respectively.
S3:
Firms with annual meeting dates between September and December, divided into firms with SB and without SB, "treated" and "control," respectively. This accommodates the possibility that the time of the annual meeting is related to an unobserved firm characteristics. S3 includes 74 firms, the largest having market capitalization of $115.6 billion (Oracle), divided into 32 treated and 42 control firms. S3.s, the subsample which excludes the largest 5% of firms, includes 71 firms with maximum size of $20.6 billion, of which 32 and 39 are "treated" and "control" firms, respectively.
The event-study analysis employs Method 3. The daily portfolio return series TMC (Treated-Minus-Control) is regressed on the Fama-French-Carhart factors and on dummy variables with the following coefficients:
(a) The coefficients of DUM1 and of DUM2, denoted respectively by dCAR1 and dCAR2, are the differential CAR between "treated" and "control" firms for DAY1 and DAY2 events, respectively. If SB is harmful, dCAR1 > 0 and dCAR2 < 0; if SB is beneficial, it is the opposite.
(b) The coefficient of DUM1-2 (= (DUM1 -DUM2)/2), dCAR1-2, is the cumulative value effect of the two rulings. If SB is harmful, dCAR1-2 > 0, and if it is beneficial, dCAR1-2 < 0.
The null hypothesis H0 is dCAR1 = dCAR2 = dCAR1-2 = 0. It means that firm value was unaffected by the changes in the potency of SB in the two Delaware court rulings.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
As seen in Table 2 , the coefficient dCAR1-2 is insignificant for samples S1, S1.s, S2, and S2.s, that is, H0 cannot be rejected, consistent with our results using CW's own sample ( Table   1 ). The coefficient dCAR1-2 is negative, dCAR1 < 0 and dCAR2 > 0. If these coefficients were statistically significant, it would suggest that SB is value increasing. Surely there is no evidence that SB is value decreasing.
The results for samples S3 and S3.s, where dCAR1-2 is negative and significant, seemingly support the hypothesis that SB is value increasing. However, given the small sample size, these results may be influenced by a few extreme returns. We thus delete firms whose announcements of earnings or dividend overlap -within a three-day window (-1 to +1) -with either DAY1 or DAY2. This deletes from S3 2 treated and 4 control firms. For the remaining 68 firms, the estimated coefficient dCAR1-2 is less negative, -1.580, with t = 1.55, statistically insignificant, meaning that H0 cannot be rejected. The negative sign of dCAR1-2, suggesting a positive albeit insignificant effect of SB on firm value, is consistent with the results of Larcker et al. (2011) and Cremers et al. (2014) on the beneficial -or at least not harmful -value effect of SB, which contrast the results of CW.
As a robustness check, we delete firms that received an acquisition offer between January and September of 2010 since the prices of these firms' stocks would be insensitive to the court rulings. As before, we delete firms with earnings or dividend announcement around the court ruling days. In addition, for S2 and S2.s, we delete from among the treated firms those whose charter required a supermajority (67% or higher) to amend a bylaw. A supermajority requirement would make it harder for shareholders to accelerate the annual meeting day, which is the subject of the Airgas case. Re-estimating the models for these samples, we obtain that the estimated coefficients of DUM1-2 and their t-values are almost unchanged.
Profitability of firms after de-staggering
In the recent two decades, many firms de-staggered their board of directors, switching to annual election of the entire board. We test whether board de-staggering affected firm profitability measured by return on assets (ROA). Firm ROA should rise after its board is destaggered if SB does harm by entrenching under-performing management and insulating it from the discipline of the market for corporate control. We do not find that. Instead, board destaggering has an insignificant negative effect on ROA.
INSERT We estimate a panel regression of annual return on assets (ROA) on a dummy variable
De-stagger that equals one in the years after the year of de-staggering, i.e., after the year in which a firm is reported as not having SB after having had it in the year before that, and it equals zero otherwise. The sample uses all firms in the ISS database that qualify to enter our sample. It includes firms that start appearing in the sample with SB and subsequently de-staggered their board and firms that had SB and never de-staggered. 10 Leverage, the sum of total long-term debt and total debt in current liabilities scaled by the sum of total long-term debt, total debt in current liabilities and total stockholder's equity, 10 We note limitations in this sample, which is widely used in studies of corporate governance. Before 2007, ISS (formerly RiskMetrics) collected governance data once every 2-3 years for all S&P1500 firms (01SEP1990, 01JUL1993, 01JUL1995, 01FEB1998, 01FEB2000, 01FEB2002, 01JAN2004, 01JAN2006). After 2006, ISS reports governance status for each S&P 1500 firm on a firm-by-firm basis once a year for each firm (i.e, different companyspecific dates for each firm as reported by the firm. For example, Apple reported SB status on 10MAY2007, 04MAR2008, 25FEB2009, 25FEB2010, 23FEB2011 while American Greetings Corp has ISS report dates on 22JUN2007, 27JUN2008, 26JUN2009, 11JUN2010, and 24JUN2011). In our analysis, De-stagger equals one in the years after the year of de-staggering. Since ISS data ends in 2011, [2012] [2013] Compustat observations use the 2011 SB status from ISS. If a firm drops from ISS before 2011 (e.g., because no longer in S&P 1500), Compustat observations after the year of the next ISS report date are dropped from the sample (because we no longer have ISS data for the firm).
negative and insignificant when adding CapEx, Leverage and R&D. The evidence does not support the view that SB harms firm performance, consistent with the evidence on the insignificant effect of the Delaware court's ruling in the Airgas case.
Review of studies on the value effect of staggered board
A number of studies find that across firms, SB is associated with lower firm value; see Mahoney and Mahoney (1993) , Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2002) , Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Faleye (2007) . SB is said to be value decreasing because it reduces the likelihood of takeovers. Indeed, Bates, Becher and Lemmon (2008) find that firms with SB are less likely to receive an acquisition offer and Field and Karpoff (2002) find that antitakeover provisions in IPO firms (including SB) reduce the likelihood of subsequent takeover. This makes the firm's stockholders forgo the potential acquisition premium. Importantly, SB insulates management from the discipline of the market for corporate control that would pressure managers to perform better or eliminate low-quality managers. SB facilitates managerial entrenchment and diminishes board accountability, and this exacerbates the agency problem due to conflicts of interests between stockholders and managers, hurting firm performance. (See review in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) .) Faleye (2007) finds that SB reduces the probability of forced CEO turnover, reduces the sensitivity of CEO turnover to the firm performance, and reduces the payperformance sensitivity in managerial compensation. Guo, Kruse and Nohel (2012) find that destaggering of corporate boards, following pressure by activist investors, causes a significant increase in stock prices. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) find that bidder firms with SB carry out worse acquisitions, observing that their stock price declines more at the acquisition announcement. However, Rose (2009) finds that the negative relation between firm value and SB exists only in firms with concentrated ownership.
Proponents of SB claim that it is beneficial to firms (Koppes, Ganske, and Haag, 1999; Lipton, Mirvis, Neff, and Katz, 2012) . SB ensures stability and continuity within the board and enables firms' management to pursue long-term strategic plans which take time to materialize. Absent SB, such long-term plans may be frustrated by hostile raiders. SB can also strengthens managers' bargaining power against hostile raiders thus enabling to extract better terms for the target firm and it may also benefit stockholder by enabling the target firm to better evaluate competing bids (Faleye, 2007) . SB may encourage director independence because they have a three-year term, thus directors who disagree with management will not be subject to not being re-nominated in the annual elections. 11 These arguments explain the results of Larcker, Ormazabal and Taylor (2001) , Cremers, Litov and Sepe (2013) and Cremers and Farrell (2014) that adoption of SB is value-increasing. They also explain the finding by Daines and Klausner (2001) that most corporate charters of firms that go public include SB provision. If issuers design corporate charters to maximize their proceeds at the IPO, SB cannot be viewed as value decreasing.
Gallgher and Grundfest (2014) review recent evidence and views on SB, disagreeing with
Harvard's Shareholder Rights Program which encouraged firms to de-stagger their board.
As CW point out, the evidence on the negative value effect of SB should be interpreted with care because it is subject to endogeneity. Adopting SB (or retaining it) may be the result of poor firm performance rather the cause for it. Also, firm value may rise following board destaggering because activist shareholders who often press managers to do that target firms where de-staggering is beneficial, but this result would not stay if de-staggering is applied to all firms.
This endogeneity problem raises a need for an analysis using an exogenous event associated with SB. Such an event is the legislating of staggered board by the state of Massachusetts in 1987.
Swartz (1998) finds that the law had no significant effect on firm value of all affected firms, which is consistent with our findings. Smith (2013) proposes another way to overcome the endogeneity problem by who employing an estimation method that uses the phenomenon of "over-voting" as an instrument. She finds that shareholder value increases around the passage of antitakeover provisions, including board classification, which is consistent with the evidence in Cremers et al. (2014) . In summary, recent evidence cast doubt on early findings that SB is harmful to firm value.
Conclusion
This paper tests whether staggered board (SB) affects firm value by studying the effects of two Delaware court rulings in the case of Airgas in 2010. The first ruling weakened the potency of SB and the second one restored it. Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW), who study this case, conclude that SB harms firm value. However, we find -both for their sample and for a different sample of firms -that the value effect is quite insignificant. Thus, there is no evidence that SB is value decreasing.
We further study the effect of board de-staggering on firm profitability and find that the change in firms' ROA following de-staggering is negative -rather than the anticipated positiveand statistically insignificant. The conclusion that emerges is that SB has no significant effect on firm performance and value. -12, 2010 and DAY2, November 23-24, 2010 . The data sample is that of CW consisting of Delawareincorporated firms with staggered board that satisfy some criteria, excluding five firms for which CRSP coverage ended before October 12, 2010 or between DAY1 and DAY2. Treated is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms whose annual meeting is between September and December (zero otherwise). The control firms are firms whose annual meeting is between January and March. The indicator variable Event2 equals1 for the second court ruling (zero otherwise). There are 134 firms. In Methods 1 and 2, each firm's CAR appears twice, once for DAY1 and once for DAY2.
Method 1: First, β coefficients are estimated for each stock over 120 days ending on September 30, 2010 by a regression of stock daily returns on MktRf, SMB, HML and UMD which are the returns on the benchmark four factors due to Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) , and a constant. The second stage does a cross-firm regression for each of the four announcement days (two for DAY1 and two for DAY2) of the firm daily return the firms' four factor β coefficients obtained in the first stage and an intercept. For each firm, CAR1 is the sum of the daily residuals for the two event days of DAY1 and CAR2 is the sum of the daily residuals for the two event days of DAY2. The latter is multiplied by -1 because the second court ruling reversed the first one. CAR1 and CAR2 are then regressed on the dummy variables Treated and Event2.
Method 2:
The first stage is repeated from Method 1. Then, the abnormal return for each of the four event days is the difference between the stock return for that day and its predicted return, calculated as the sum of the products of the estimated β coefficients by the respective factor returns for that day, plus the intercept. These daily abnormal returns are then aggregated into CAR1 and CAR2, the latter being multiplied by -1.
Method 3: Portfolio abnormal returns. We calculate the daily average return on two stock portfolios of treated and control firms. TMC is the Treated-Minus-Control differential return. The estimation period is April 1-December 31 of 2010, 191 days. We regress TMC on the four factors of Fama and French and Carhart and on two dummy variables, DUM1 = 0.5 and DUM2 = 0.5 for each of the two days of DAY1 and DAY2, respectively or instead on DUM1-2 = 0.25, 0.25, -0.25, -0.25 for the four event days of DAY1 and DAY2; the negative sign for DAY2 follows the methodology of CW, thus the coefficient of DUM1-2 provides the cumulative value effect of the weakening of SB. 
